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Abstract
The expansion and growth of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1300s is one that has both intrigued and
puzzled Western scholars for many years. Small bands of Islamic frontier raiders were able to join together and
ultimately become a powerful empire that spanned three continents and had subjects of many different
religions, cultural backgrounds and ethnicities. How did this happen? What was the spark that ignited the
wildfire that would become the mighty and feared Ottoman Empire? Looking back on Ottoman history, one
major acquisition, that is, the successful capture of a peninsula known as Gallipoli or Gelibolu in the Aegean
Sea would give the Ottomans a permanent foothold in Europe from which to launch their forces into the
Balkans and was responsible for the amazing Ottoman expansion after 1300. The strategic location of Gallipoli
between Anatolia and the Middle East and Europe has made Gallipoli one of the most strategic locations
within the Ottoman Empire, serving as a gateway between continents. History has proven that whichever
nation has been able to hold Gallipoli has been able to keep power in the region.
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Gallipoli: The Spark That Would Ignite an 
Empire 
Brendan Quigley 
The expansion and growth of the Ottoman 
Empire in the early 1300s is one that has both 
intrigued and puzzled Western scholars for many 
years. Small bands of Islamic frontier raiders were 
able to join together and ultimately become a 
powerful empire that spanned three continents and 
had subjects of many different religions, cultural 
backgrounds and ethnicities. How did this happen? 
What was the spark that ignited the wildfire that 
would become the mighty and feared Ottoman 
Empire? Looking back on Ottoman history, one 
major acquisition, that is, the successful capture of a 
peninsula known as Gallipoli or Gelibolu in the 
Aegean Sea would give the Ottomans a permanent 
foothold in Europe from which to launch their 
 122 
forces into the Balkans and was responsible for the 
amazing Ottoman expansion after 1300. The 
strategic location of Gallipoli between Anatolia and 
the Middle East and Europe has made Gallipoli one 
of the most strategic locations within the Ottoman 
Empire, serving as a gateway between continents. 
History has proven that whichever nation has been 
able to hold Gallipoli has been able to keep power 
in the region. 
In order to understand the significance of the 
Gallipoli peninsula it is necessary to first look to the 
beginnings of the Ottoman Empire. This empire 
was able to emerge around the turn of the 14
th
 
century in Anatolia by joining many independent 
clans or ―states‖ that shared a common goal; to 
expand the influence of Islam in the region. The 
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once defining historical thesis on this significant 
spark that would be the origins of the Ottoman 
Empire was written by Paul Wittek in 1937. This 
―Ghazi Thesis‖ proposed that it was the religious 
zeal of Islam that drove many of these Turkish 
raiders to spread across the Middle East and into 
Europe, taking control of land and people in an 
attempt to convert them to Islam.
1
 While this thesis 
has been hotly debated for decades, one thing is 
certain, and that is that these groups of raiders, for 
whatever reason, did manage to expand from the 
frontiers of Anatolia into the Middle East and Asia 
as well as the Balkans of Europe, and Gallipoli 
would become the main reason for the latter. 
                                                 
1
 Heath Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman 
State (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 
2003), 2. 
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The early years for this band of frontier 
principalities were full of violence and bloodshed. 
This small confederation of Islamist states struggled 
to survive amongst several more powerful 
neighbors including the Persians and Byzantines. 
However, it was in these early years of the Ottoman 
Empire (in the 1350s) that a wise Orhan Bey, the 
son of Osman (creator of the Ottoman Empire), 
noticed internal struggle within their close neighbor, 
the Byzantine Empire, and decided to would take 
advantage of the situation. In 1346 Orhan made an 
alliance with John VI Cantacuzemus, a ―claimant‖ 
or ―pretender‖ to the Byzantine throne.
2
 To solidify 
the alliance, Orhan married Cantacuzemus‘s 
daughter, Theodora. This alliance put 6,000 
                                                 
2
 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical 
Age 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973), 9. 
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Ottoman troops in Byzantine territory to support the 
rebel cause and gave Orhan an excuse to meddle in 
Byzantine affairs.
3
 When Cantacuzemus called for 
Ottoman support against the Serbs and Bulgarians 
in 1352, Orhan quickly dispatched his troops to 
Thrace, an outpost on the eastern side of Gallipoli, 
leaving his son, Suleyman Pasha, in charge of all 
Ottoman forces in the area. Suleyman‘s forces were 
able to take Thrace, but instead of putting the land 
back in Cantacuzemus‘s hands, Suleyman decided 
to bring in more troops from Anatolia and lay siege 
to the fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula.
4
 
Although Cantacuzemus strongly insisted that 
                                                 
3
 Steven Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699 
(New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2003), 13. 
4
 Ibid., 9. 
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Suleyman immediately retreat from Thrace and 
Gallipoli, his protests fell on deaf Ottoman ears.
5
 
 Although Suleyman had captured Thrace 
and was able to replenish his forces with more 
troops from Anatolia, his siege of the Gallipoli 
fortresses was moving at a very slow rate. In a last 
ditch attempt to regain lost Byzantine land in 
Thrace, John VI Cantacuzemus offered to pay 
Orhan to leave. Just as the Ottomans were about to 
accept this deal the area was rocked with a violent 
earthquake. It broke down the walls of several 
fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula and caused 
major damage to the surrounding villages. While 
the Christian defenders rushed out from their 
devastated stronghold, Ottoman forces took control 
                                                 
5
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and quickly rebuilt what was destroyed.
6
 Again 
Suleyman brought in more troops and supplies to 
fortify his new outpost. This move sent shockwaves 
throughout Europe, as calls for a Crusade began to 
be heard throughout the continent.
7
 
 Many historians look back on the taking of 
Gallipoli as a major turning point in Ottoman 
history. Halil Inalcik writes in his book, The 
Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, 
that prior to the acquisition of Gallipoli the Ottoman 
State was ―no more than one of many frontier 
principalities,‖ and that ―the events after 1352 so 
firmly established its superiority over others that 
within 30 years they had become a tight knit and 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 13. 
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powerful empire.‖
8
 Inalcik would also claim that 
the conquest of Gallipoli was a ―crucial event‖ for 
the Ottomans, as the Ottomans were able to ―gain a 
foothold in the Balkans with the prospects of 
limitless expansion towards the west.‖
9
 The later 
capture of Constantinople, as well as Ottoman 
excursions into Serbia, Wallachia, Hungary, 
Byzantium, and other Balkan lands would be the 
direct result of the seizure of Gallipoli. Carter 
Findley writes that the Ottomans were able to 
expand because of their conquest and winning of 
conquered societies as a direct result of their prime 
location and stronghold in Gallipoli.
10
 This 
peninsula provided a spring board for later Ottoman 
                                                 
8
 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, 9. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Carter Vaughn Findley, The Turks in World 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 110. 
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advances into Europe and, as long as the Ottomans 
were able to keep control of it, they had a vital 
lifeline from their homeland into Europe. 
 Also related to the success at Gallipoli was 
Sultan Murad I‘s decision to move the Ottoman 
capital from Bursa to Edirne. At the time Edirne 
was located on the outskirts of Ottoman territory 
and very close to ―hostile neighbors‖. Steve 
Turnbull claims that this bold move clearly showed 
that Murad believed he could and was about to 
expand his empire, ―making his advance from a 
firm base in the Gellibolu area.‖
11
 Mark Mazower 
also notes that less than 20 years after Orhan was 
able to win a foothold on Gallipoli the Byzantine 
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Emperor, Jean V Paleologue made his submission 
to his successor Murad I.
12
 
 As the Christian powers became 
increasingly worried about a growing Ottoman 
Empire, plans were made to snatch Gallipoli back 
from Ottoman hands. Although talks of a crusade 
began to fester in Europe, they did not come to 
fruition at this time and the only ruler to respond to 
the request was the Byzantine Emperor‘s cousin, 
Duke Amadeus VI of Savoy.
13
 In 1366 Amadeus 
was able to capture Gallipoli and immediately 
returned it to the Byzantines.
14
 This loss was a 
major setback for the Ottomans, as they were 
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 Mark Mazower, Salonica City of Ghosts: 
Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950 (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2004), 36. 
13
 Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire, 22. 
14
 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 
12. 
 131 
effectively cut off from their conquered European 
lands. Ottoman expansion westward came to a 
grinding halt without the troops and supplies that 
the Gallipoli lifeline provided.
15
 While this time 
was certainly a frantic and worried for Ottoman 
leaders, Gallipoli would fall back into Ottoman 
hands in 1376, thanks to an arrangement by Murad I 
where he secured the Byzantine throne for 
Adronicus IV in exchange for the vital peninsula.
16
 
 From this trade it becomes apparent that 
Gallipoli was important to the Ottomans and that 
they knew it. As stated before it was certainly a 
lifeline into the Balkans and would later be used as 
a buffer to stop advancing armies and navies into 
Ottoman lands. It is also important to note the 
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importance of Gallipoli in a social sense. After 
Suleyman took control of Gallipoli, and to a greater 
extent when Murad I retained Gallipoli in 1376, 
both Ottoman rulers began to strengthen this 
―European stronghold‖ with Muslims from 
Anatolia. The majority of Turkish civilians that 
moved to this land were nomads, as it was believed 
that they could easily transition and adapt to a new 
Ottoman acquisition.
17
 Turkish villages began to 
spring up and establish a frontier that kept 
expanding as more and more Turks settled in this 
land. Although the Turks would have skirmishes 
and battles in and around Gallipoli over the course 
of the next 538 years, the area would never fall out 
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of Ottoman hands, allowing a unique Turkish 
culture to flourish.
18
 
 Drawing a timeline backwards from the 
many accomplishments of the Ottoman Empire, one 
can see that Gallipoli is often where these 
accomplishments originated. While this may be a 
bold statement, many of the Ottoman advances, 
including naval advances, came from the 
springboard that was Gallipoli. Events that would 
not seem associated with Gallipoli, upon further 
inspection, turn out to be directly related to this vital 
conquest. For example, Ottoman offenses against 
the Byzantines in 1357 (which began in Gallipoli) 
led to the capture of Adrianople. From the prisoners 
of a captured Adrianople, Sultan Murad I created 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 10. 
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the first Janissary Corps.
19
 In later years the 
Janissaries would be used as the tip of the Ottoman 
―spear,‖ becoming the first standing army and 
replacing ―ghazi‖ tribal warriors. In later years the 
Jannisaries would be key to winning many battles, 
especially against John Hunyadi and the 
Hungarians. If Murad was never able to capture 
Adrianople using forces from Gallipoli, the idea of 
the Janissaries might never have come to be 
realized, and history would have been changed 
forever. 
 Another pinnacle in Ottoman history was the 
sacking of Constantinople, the capital of an aging 
Byzantine Empire. While many nations, tribal 
groups, and empires before the Ottomans had tried 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., 11. 
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to capture the ancient city, all had failed. In 1453 a 
young Sultan, Mehmet II, decided that he would try 
his hand at doing what others before him had failed 
to accomplish: conquering Constantinople. While 
the defenses of Constantinople were impressive--
they had managed to keep the capital in Byzantine 
hands well after the fall of the Roman Empire--
Mehmet II decided to attack the capital from both 
land and sea, using a naval force that was assembled 
at Gallipoli. Although initially unsuccessful in their 
attack on a much smaller Venetian force, the 
Ottoman navy was able to strike a blow to the 
Byzantines after several vessels were carried over a 
small patch of land into waters close to the city 
walls.
20
 As was the case in many Ottoman offenses 
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of this period and future periods, Gallipoli was vital 
in acquiring new lands and defeating Ottoman 
enemies.  
 It is also important to understand the role 
that the Ottoman navy played in Ottoman history. 
After conquering the Byzantine Empire and 
expanding Ottoman territory upwards to the 
Mediterranean the Ottomans had traded one enemy 
for a new one. This enemy was the Venetians of 
present-day Italy. While the Ottomans were feared 
for the skill of their armies, their navy at this point 
was still relatively weak. The Venetians, boasting a 
proud and very successful navy, had often fought 
skirmishes with the Ottoman navy and, in an 
attempt to destroy the Ottoman fleet, they attacked 
                                                                                     
330: The Ottoman Empire. September 28
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the naval base at Gallipoli in 1416.
21
 Although the 
Venetians were able to decimate the Ottoman navy 
at Gallipoli, they could not overtake the Ottoman 
fortresses or destroy the inner harbor naval base and 
were forced to sign a treaty with Mehmet I to ―keep 
the status quo.‖22 As would be the case with the 
Ottoman navy for years to come, they were forced 
to rebuild, but maintained power in the region. 
Because the Turks were able to keep Gallipoli, they 
could still keep their power in the region. 
 Although firmly in Ottoman possession, 
Gallipoli seemed to be at the forefront of Byzantine 
and Ottoman minds. As the halfway point (at least 
until Ottoman control of Constantinople in 1453) 
between Byzantine Europe and the Ottoman Middle 
                                                 
21
 Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The ClassicalAge, 
18. 
22
 Ibid., 134. 
 138 
East, whoever held this valuable land had a great 
chance of keeping the other power in check. A 
major scare for Ottoman forces immediately 
followed Sultan Mehmet I‘s death in 1421, as 
Mehmet‘s rebellious brother Mustafa agreed to cede 
Gallipoli back to the Byzantines. Again the 
Ottomans were in danger of losing their most 
valuable staging ground and naval base. Mehmet‘s 
young son, Murad, realized this and decided to fight 
against his uncle using a loyal Janissary Corps. 
Murad was able to defeat Mustafa, keep Gallipoli in 
Ottoman hands, and regain lost Byzantine lands that 
his father had fought so hard to obtain.
23
 
 As the Ottoman Empire began to expand 
past Gallipoli in the late 1400s it became less of 
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buffer against the West but was still very important 
to the empire in many other ways. During the late 
1400s the Ottomans began a profitable trade 
relationship with Florence, and used the port at 
Gallipoli as a major trading center. This helped the 
Ottoman economy to grow and prosper during this 
time.
24
 Gallipoli also became a major mill for 
producing gunpowder for Ottoman guns during the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, as its proximity to the 
Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea allowed for 
quick distribution to other Ottoman held territories. 
It must also be noted that Gallipoli was the main 
center for producing the cloth for the sails on ships 
during the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century and the largest 
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naval dockyard in the Ottoman Empire for well over 
a century.
25
 
 In understanding the importance of Gallipoli 
as a naval base one must understand the 
significance that the Ottomans put on their navy 
starting with Mehmet II. Mehmet the Conqueror 
understood that a powerful army would only 
advance the Ottomans so far without the aid of a 
strong navy. He learned this lesson battling smaller 
numbers of Venetian ships and losing in the Siege 
of Constantinople. In fact, many Sultans after 
Mehmet attempted to strengthen their navy so that 
they would be on par with or more powerful than 
the navies of their adversaries. With this in mind the 
                                                 
25
 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: 
The Structure of Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 295, 292. 
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Ottoman leaders carefully chose the Governor of 
Gallipoli, as he would become the commander of 
the entire Ottoman Mediterranean fleet.
26
 This post 
became one of the most important in the entire 
Ottoman Empire.
27
 
 While the history of Gallipoli before the 20
th
 
century shows how important this little peninsula 
was to the creation and endurance of the Ottoman 
Empire for over 500 years, this significance is often 
overshadowed by the events that unfolded there in 
the Great War, World War I. The Ottoman Empire 
joined the war on the side of the Central Powers: 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Because 
warfare had stalled and trench warfare resulted in a 
stalemate, British and French forces decided in 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 297. 
27
 Ibid., 297. 
 142 
1914 and 1915 that they would attempt to end the 
war quickly by defeating Turkey and adding a new 
supply route to their ally, Russia.
28
 The logical 
location for attack fell upon the peninsula of 
Gallipoli. 
 Despite the vital importance of Gallipoli, its 
defenses fell into disrepair after years of inaction. 
Only after Mahmut II‘s shock at a major Ottoman 
loss at Konya did he attempt to strengthen his 
defenses, including Gallipoli in 1837.
29
 Viewing 
the aging and obsolete fortresses falling apart after 
the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 again focus was 
placed on improving Gallipoli but progress was 
slow. By the time World War I broke out in 1914, 
                                                 
28
 Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End to the Myth (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 43. 
29
 Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 41. 
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the Ottomans were ―not ready‖ for war. In early 
August of 1914 Gallipoli was ill equipped and 
seriously lacking man power and weapons. Three 
infantry divisions on the peninsula only made up 
14,000 troops and 2,300 animals. After a quick rush 
to resupply, troop numbers were up to 30,000 men 
and 7,000 animals within months.
30
 Even with these 
preparations the land around the Dardanelles was 
still weak from aging and obsolete fortifications. To 
assist their allies, the Germans sent Admiral von 
Usedom, an expert in sea costal defenses, as well as 
500 German costal artillery and mine experts to 
defend against a possible Allied attack.
31
 The 
Germans were also able to send limited supplies to 
                                                 
30
 Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of 
the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 76. 
31
 Ibid., 77. 
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the Ottomans through neutral Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
 Hostilities against the Ottomans started in 
November of 1914 with the British ―briefly‖ 
bombarding Turkish forts along the Dardanelles. 
While damage was small, the British did succeed in 
accelerating Turkish fortifications.
32
 By early 1915 
Gallipoli had added a further 6,000 soldiers, 263 
more cannons as well as eight machine guns. In 
1915 the 19
th
 Infantry Division fell under the 
command of a ―young‖ and ―aggressive‖ Colonel 
Mustafa Kemal Bey, later to become the founder of 
an independent Turkey.
33
 This escalation of troops 
and supplies shows that the Turks feared losing 
Gallipoli, just as the Byzantines had 500 years 
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33
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before. Thanks to German 150 millimeter howitzer 
cannons, the Turks at Gallipoli wreaked havoc on 
British ships passing through the narrow straits.
34
 
 Although taking significant damage from 
Turkish defenses, the British Navy was able to deal 
several major blows to the Ottomans, including a 
battle in the winter of 1915 in which fortresses on 
Kum Kale and Seddelbahir were completely 
destroyed.
35
 This victory gave the British a false 
sense of hope, as their hopes that the Ottoman 
defenders were weak and incompetent were correct. 
As the British prepared for a major naval assault 
against the Turkish defenses at Gallipoli and the 
surrounding coastal lands, the Ottomans went to 
work relaying mines and submarine nets and 
                                                 
34
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rebuilding destroyed defenses. Their strategy for 
defeating the British and keeping a firm hold of 
Gallipoli hindered on 3 main points: 
1- Mobile howitzer cannons were to be used to 
strike at an incoming fleet and stop any 
minesweeping ships from taking the lead of 
the incoming fleet. 
2- Underwater mines and anti-submarine nets 
would destroy ships too big to be destroyed 
with howitzer cannons. 
3-  Improved costal defenses would deal with 
any ships that made it through the first two 
points.
36
 
 
The British and French naval assault finally came in 
the spring of 1915, as the allied navies attempted to 
punch through the Dardanelles into the Sea of 
Marmara. At first the allied navy had success in 
silencing a few forts, but heavy howitzer fire caused 
damage and confusion amongst the European ships. 
The assault was called off after three ships had 
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quickly sunk as a result of hitting underwater mines 
and three larger battleships were greatly damaged 
from other mines. It was at this point that the 
British realized they could not control the 
Dardanelles with a naval force alone, and prepared 
the armies of France, England, Australia, and New 
Zealand for a ground offensive to destroy Ottoman 
fortifications and troops in an attempt to capture 
Gallipoli.
37
 Thanks to minor British attacks and 
invasion scares, Turkish troop readiness had 
reached a high level prior to the Gallipoli 
Campaign.
38
 
 In describing the Gallipoli Campaign 
historian Edward J. Erickson claims that it was a 
coming of age for not only the Turks, but for 
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Australians and New Zealanders as well: ―The 
victory at Gallipoli was of huge physical and 
psychological importance and is vividly 
remembered in Turkey today.‖
39
 It is often 
remembered as a major and terrible disaster for the 
allies, with an estimated 280,000 allied casualties 
(44,000 deaths).
40
 Adding insult to injury, British 
and French naval forces entered the Gallipoli 
straights knowing the Ottomans were low on 
artillery ammunition.
41
 A British Admiral even 
went as far as to send a cable to Winston Churchill 
before entering the Dardanelles, telling him to 
―expect Allied forces in Istanbul within 14 days‖.42 
This, of course, did not happen and, although 
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Ottoman losses were also very heavy, Allied ground 
forces were unable to make it past the Turkish lines 
on the rocky and steep slopes of Gallipoli.  
 Turkish forces fought gallantly to defend 
every inch of Gallipoli, as Colonel Mustafa Kemal 
ordered his famous lines to his 19
th
 Infantry 
Regiment as they were running low on ammunition, 
―I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. In 
the time which passes until we die, other troops and 
commanders can come forward and take our 
places.‖43 As allied forces could not make any 
headway in taking control of Gallipoli, the order 
was given to evacuate. British commanders 
expected heavy Allied losses, as many troops were 
dug in extremely close to the Ottoman enemy. 
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However, the most successful Allied operation of 
the entire Gallipoli Campaign was its retreat from 
the peninsula. For all the bad planning and mistakes 
that went into the initial invasion, not one man was 
lost in the Allied retreat, as stealth, careful 
maneuvering, and decoys such as machine guns 
firing without operators (thanks to emptying 
sandbags attached to triggers) allowed Allied troops 
to escape unharmed. 44 
 The aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign 
was one of excitement and pride for the Turks. 
They had defeated troops from Australia, New 
Zealand, France, and Britain and stopped them from 
taking over Ottoman territory, ultimately forcing the 
allies to abandon their Turkish campaign. This 
                                                 
44
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victory also proved to the Turks that they could 
stand up to Europe and support themselves, 
something that they would remember when they 
fought for their independence in the early 1920s. 
Erickson sums up the feeling from a Turkish 
perspective:  
For the Turks the Gallipoli campaign evokes 
the same kinds of memories as Gettysburg, 
the Somme, Verdun, or Leningrad do for the 
Americans, British, French, and Russians, 
respectively. The campaign is also similarly 
embedded in the psyche of the people of 
Australia and New Zealand who continue to 
celebrate Anzac Day.
45
 
 
While it is true that Turks today remember the 
Gallipoli campaign vividly, the same goes for 
Australians and New Zealanders. One might ask 
why such a terrible, costly, and embarrassing defeat 
is still cherished in Australian and New Zealand 
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minds, and it is because this conflict was the first 
time that an independent Australia and New 
Zealand were involved in any conflict as their own 
sovereign power. Although a disaster, these 
countrymen are very proud of their ancestor‘s 
sacrifice, something that is visible every April 25
th
, 
ANZAC Day. 
 In conclusion, the strategic location of 
Gallipoli between the Middle East and Europe had 
made Gallipoli one of the most important places 
within the Ottoman Empire. Whichever group 
claimed control over Gallipoli, whether it be the 
Greeks, the Byzantines, or the Ottomans, often had 
control over the region and could exert their 
influence into adjacent lands. Because the Ottomans 
were able to gain control of Gallipoli, through 
 153 
cunning and help from Mother Nature, they were 
able to expand their empire into Europe, grow at a 
very fast rate, and ultimately rise to become a very 
powerful and dominant empire. Keeping control of 
Gallipoli was central to maintaining power, 
something the Ottomans knew very well, as they 
successfully defended the land from the Byantines, 
Serbs, Hungarians, Venetians, and much later the 
combined forces of the British, French, New 
Zealanders, and Australians.  
The successful defense of Gallipoli in World 
War I also helped propel Mustafa Kemal, the future 
founder of Turkey as an independent country, to an 
icon status. Although Allied forces in World War I 
were unsuccessful in capturing Gallipoli, the 
experience was none the less important to the 
 154 
cultural psyche of Australia, New Zealand, and 
Turkey. Mustafa Kemal accurately described the 
feeling between all nations involved in the Gallipoli 
campaign with these words in 1934:  
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost 
their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a 
friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. 
There is no difference between the Johnnies 
and the Mehmets to us where they lie side 
by side here in this country of ours. You, the 
mothers, who sent their sons from far away 
countries, wipe away your tears; your sons 
are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. 
After having lost their lives on this land they 
have become our sons as well.
46
 
 
In the end, Gallipoli proved to be one of the most 
important – if not the most important – Ottoman 
held territory in its storied existence. Since 
regaining the land in 1377, it has stayed firmly in 
Turkish hands under the Ottomans and later the 
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Republic of Turkey, where it remains today. 
Although there have not been any major battles in 
Gallipoli in many years, the Turks still stand ready, 
knowing that this gateway between Europe and the 
Middle East is still a sought after commodity. 
